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ABSTRACT 
 
 
MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND TAKEOVER WEALTH GAINS 
 
By 
 
EBRU REIS 
 
DECEMBER 5, 2006 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jayant R. Kale 
 
Major Department: Finance 
 
 
 This study examines the relationship between managerial equity incentives and 
takeover wealth gains both for target and acquirer firms. Although there is some research 
about the effect of acquirer managers’ incentives on acquirer wealth gains, this paper is one 
of the first to investigate the effect of target managers’ incentives on the wealth effects of 
target firms in corporate takeovers. In addition, prior research has focused on the alignment 
effect of equity incentives in takeovers. However, takeovers provide an opportunity to 
liquidate personal equity portfolio for managers who hold an undiversified portfolio of their 
firms’ stock. In this study, I identify two hypotheses that potentially explain the effect of 
target managers’ incentives on wealth gains. While incentive alignment hypothesis predicts 
a positive relationship, diversification driven-liquidity hypothesis predicts a negative 
relationship between target managerial incentives and target wealth gains. I use a sample of 
656 successful and 104 failed acquisitions over the period 1994-2003 to test these 
competing hypotheses. I find that for targets that are less (more) diversified, equity 
incentives are negatively (positively) related to wealth effects. I also find that the target 
managerial incentives increase the success probability of a takeover bid and this positive 
effect is less pronounced for diversified target managers. Based on these results, I conclude 
that incentive alignment argument is dominated by liquidity argument in less diversified 
target firms, however, holds in diversified firms. For acquirer managers, I do not find any 
evidence that supports incentive alignment or diversification arguments. 
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1. Introduction  
In corporate takeovers, the firm specific equity holdings of target and acquirer 
managers provide two different incentives that may affect the takeover wealth effects for 
firms’ shareholders. First, managers stand to share the benefit from the takeover wealth 
gains via the increase in the value of their firm-specific equity portfolio. Thus, they are 
induced to take value-maximizing investment decisions. Second, they may use the takeover 
transaction as an opportunity to obtain liquidity (target managers) or increase the 
diversification level of the firm (acquirer managers), in order to reduce or eliminate the risk 
of holding an undiversified firm-specific equity portfolio. In pursuit of diversification, 
managers may take acquisition decisions at the expense of firms’ shareholders. Examining 
the effectiveness of equity-based compensation in corporate takeovers, prior research has 
focused on the alignment effect of equity incentives. In this study, I identify two competing 
hypotheses that potentially explain the effect of target and acquirer CEOs’ equity incentives 
on takeover wealth gains.   
Both target and acquirer CEOs share the benefit from takeover wealth gains via the 
increase in the value of their equity portfolio invested in the firm’s stock, thus the equity 
based incentives of managers are expected to increase the wealth gains to both target and 
acquiring firm’s shareholders. Based on this, the Incentive Alignment hypothesis predicts 
that both target and acquiring firm shareholders’ wealth gains from takeovers are positively 
related to the equity-based incentives of target and acquiring firm managers, respectively.  
On the other hand, target manager, who is unable to diversify his equity portfolio 
due to the trading limitations, may sacrifice takeover premiums in order to benefit from the 
opportunity of liquidating his equity portfolio through the takeover transaction. The benefit 
of this opportunity is likely to increase as more of the manager’s wealth is linked to the 
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firm’s wealth, thus at higher levels of manager’s equity incentives. Therefore, 
Diversification driven-liquidity hypothesis predicts that target wealth gains are decreasing in 
target CEO’s equity incentives. I expect this explanation to be more dominant for the target 
managers in undiversified firms relative to the target managers in diversified firms. 
From acquiring CEO’s perspective, in addition to the incentive alignment, 
diversification objectives may also play a role in determining the relation between equity 
incentives and acquirer wealth gains. Since acquirer CEO’s equity portfolio is not fully 
diversified, he may undertake value-destroying diversifying acquisitions in order to 
decrease his risk. Therefore, according to the Diversification hypothesis for acquirer CEOs, 
acquirer firm returns are expected to decrease in the equity incentives of the acquiring CEO, 
if he is undertaking a diversifying acquisition.  
I use a sample of 760 public U.S. target firms, consisting of 656 completed and 104 
failed takeovers and examine these competing hypotheses to explain the relationship 
between managerial incentives and takeover wealth gains in target and acquiring firms. The 
sample period is from January 1, 1994, to December 31, 2003. A substantial part of this 
unique sample (275 targets) consists of firms for which CEO compensation data is collected 
using proxy statements, since the data is unavailable on ExecuComp for the year prior to the 
acquisition announcement. I define the equity-based incentives (EBI) of the manager as the 
dollar change in the value of stock and stock options that the CEO holds, for every $100 
change in the total shareholders’ wealth in the year prior to the acquisition announcement. 
This measure aims to capture the incentives that motivate a CEO to increase shareholders’ 
wealth.   
 I measure wealth gains to target and acquiring firms using both percentage 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) as well as Abnormal Dollar Returns. Although most 
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studies in takeover wealth gains focus on the announcement CARs, I believe that abnormal 
dollar returns that accrue to the shareholders around acquisition announcements reflect the 
net present value to firm shareholders, and capture another important aspect of the takeover 
decision. I use several control variables, such as attitude of the acquirer, mode of the 
payment, acquisition technique, multiple bidders, diversification level of target and 
acquiring firms, governance index of the target firm, size and relative size of the target firm 
that suggested as determinants of takeover wealth gains in the literature.  
I find that in the overall sample of completed takeovers, target managers’ incentives 
do not appear to have a significant effect on target wealth gains. This is possibly because 
both liquidity and incentive alignment explain the relationship between equity incentives 
and takeover wealth gains, canceling out each other’s effects. In order to examine this issue 
further, I condition managerial incentives on the level of target diversification to capture the 
potential different effect of managerial incentives on target wealth gains in diversified 
versus undiversified firms. This allows me to distinguish between the incentive alignment 
and liquidity hypotheses. I use alternative measures to identify diversified and undiversified 
target firms for robustness purposes. The construction of these measures is described in 
Section 3. I find an asymmetric relation between the effects of EBI on target wealth gains in 
less diversified versus more diversified firms. Specifically, I find that target wealth effects 
are decreasing in EBI in the less diversified targets and increasing in EBI in more 
diversified targets.  
Overall, this evidence suggests that while the incentive alignment is dominant in 
more diversified target firms, the liquidity effect is more pronounced for target CEOs in less 
diversified firms. These results are robust to alternative measures of wealth gains. 
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In my analysis of acquirer CEOs’ equity incentives and acquirer firm wealth gains, I 
do not find any evidence supporting the incentive alignment or diversification arguments for 
acquirer CEOs. This may be attributed to the existence of different factors affecting the 
relationship between equity incentives of acquirers’ CEOs and acquirer wealth gains, which 
are not included in this analysis. These may especially stem from the significant difference 
in size between acquiring and target firms.   
Next, I examine the effect of the target and acquiring CEO’s incentives on the 
success probability of takeovers by including failed takeovers in my analysis. I find strong 
evidence that managerial incentives of target managers are positively related to the success 
probability of takeovers in the overall sample. Finally, I find that while the positive effect of 
managerial incentives on the success probability of takeover persists in less diversified 
firms, further supporting the liquidity argument, the relation is weak in more diversified 
firms.  
Overall, my findings provide evidence that liquidity argument dominates in 
takeovers where targets are less diversified, thus explaining the negative relation between 
equity-based managerial incentives and takeover gains. Based on my findings, I also 
conclude that the incentive alignment argument is the dominant explanation for the target 
managers’ motives in the group of diversified firms.  
This study builds on the existing literature in several ways. A majority of previous 
research focuses on the impact of managerial incentives on the acquisition returns for the 
acquirer shareholders. To the best of my knowledge, this is one of few the studies that 
examine the relationship between equity-based incentives of target CEOs and target 
takeover wealth gains. In addition, in examining the relation between managerial incentives 
and takeover wealth gains, I also consider the diversification driven-liquidity needs of 
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managers who are forced to hold undiversified equity portfolios. This contributes to the 
ongoing debate on the effectiveness of incentive pay in aligning the interests of managers 
with those of shareholders. Finally, analyzing the relationship between acquirer CEO’s 
equity incentives and acquirer firm wealth changes, I did not find any evidence supporting 
incentive alignment argument inconsistent with Datta et al.’s (2001) results.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, I present a review 
of the related literature and develop my research hypotheses. Section 3 describes sample 
selection procedures, construction of main and control variables. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 provides a summary and concludes the study. 
 
2. Related Literature and Development of Hypotheses 
2.1. Overview 
Several studies focus on the abnormal announcement returns to target and acquirer 
firms over the last twenty years. Much evidence has been produced showing a sharp 
difference between acquirer and target returns (For example, see Jensen and Ruback (1983), 
Jarrell, Brinkley and Netter (1988), Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Fuller, Netter, 
and Stegemoller (2002), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005)). Although different 
researchers interpret these results differently, the main finding is takeovers create a positive 
gain for the combined firm on average. However, a larger portion or almost all of this gain 
accrues to the target shareholders. Acquirer shareholders do not seem to gain much on 
average from the acquisition transaction. For example, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2005) examined a sample of takeovers over 1991-2001 and find that the acquiring firms’ 
shareholders lost an aggregate $216 billion. As a result of these findings, several studies try 
to explain the underlying motives of acquiring manager for value-destroying acquisition 
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decisions. Managerial objectives (e.g. diversification, increasing size etc.) (Shleifer and 
Vishny, (1990)), the desire to gain reputation and prestige (Avery, Chevalier and Schaefer, 
(1998)), decreasing the probability of being acquired (Gorton, Kahl, Rosen, (2002)) are all 
suggested as potential motives for managers inducing them to deviate from value-
maximizing decisions in takeovers. All these potential motives are consistent with the 
traditional agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, (1976)), which suggests that managers may 
prefer to maximize their own wealth or private benefits rather than maximizing the 
shareholders’ wealth when they bear less than 100% of the cost of these investment 
decisions. 
Under the agency theory, the objective of linking manager’s compensation with the 
wealth of the shareholders through stock and/or options holdings of the firm is to align 
managers with the interest of shareholders and mitigate agency problems between them 
(Fama (1980), Haugen and Senbet (1981), Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Jensen and Murphy 
(1994)). Empirically, Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) show that there is a positive 
relationship between the stock and stock options holdings of managers and firm variance 
and financial leverage based on a sample of acquiring and divesting firms over the period 
1974-1982. This supports the argument that executive equity holdings have a role in 
reducing agency problems. Consistent with this view, previous research investigating 
managerial incentives and corporate investment decisions find that firm performance is 
increasing in the equity holdings of managers. For example, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) 
provide empirical evidence that both firm performance and investment are increasing in 
managerial incentives for a sample of U.S. firms over the period 1993-1998. Lewellen, 
Loderer and Rosenfeld (1985) and Amihud, Lev Travlos (1990) find that in corporate 
takeovers bidder management’s ownership has a positive impact on bidder announcement 
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returns. Carline, Linn and Yadav (2002) find that managerial ownership is positively related 
to the changes in operating performance resulting from an acquisition.  
In this paper, I build on this literature by concentrating on the effectiveness of the 
equity-based compensation (such as stock and stock options) in providing incentives to 
maximize shareholders’ wealth in corporate takeovers1. Corporate takeovers provide an 
ideal setting for testing the incentives of a manager to act in the interest of the shareholders. 
As takeovers are usually big transactions with a potential to have a significant impact on the 
stock prices of both target and acquiring firms, they provide perfect opportunity for 
managers to deviate from value-maximizing behavior in pursuit of consuming perquisites 
and/or empire-building desires. Therefore, in this study, I explore the existence of 
alternative explanations that may weaken or strengthen the impact of incentive pay such as 
diversification driven-liquidity needs of the manager for his own equity portfolio.  
2.2. Target Managerial Incentives and Takeover Wealth Gains 
A. Incentive Alignment  
Based on previously documented evidence, the incentive alignment hypothesis 
predicts that the equity-based incentives of the target firm CEO are positively related to the 
wealth gains created in takeovers for target shareholders, since target CEO will share the 
benefits of the wealth gains via the increase in the value of the equity portfolio (holdings of 
stocks and stock options) he holds in the firm’s stock.  
B. Diversification Driven-Liquidity  
The equity portfolios of target CEOs are subject to several liquidity constraints, thus 
they hold undiversified stock and stock options of their own firms. In almost all of the 
                                                 
1 Hall and Liebman (1998) provide evidence from samples of large U.S. firms that majority of the overall 
sensitivity of CEO equity-based wealth to changes in stock price comes from stock and stock option holding 
of the CEO. 
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cases, the restricted stocks become unrestricted, and unvested options became vested in case 
of change-in control contractually. Therefore, according to the liquidity hypothesis, target 
managers who hold large undiversified equity portfolios will be willing to accept lower 
acquisition premiums to obtain liquidity in order to diversify their personal wealth by 
investing elsewhere with the payments they received from the takeover deal. However, 
liquidity argument will lose most of its power in diversified firms where managers have less 
diversification driven-liquidity needs since they are already holding an equity portfolio of a 
diversified firm. Therefore, I expect the illiquidity effect to have less impact in the sub-
sample of diversified firms.  
In addition, if liquidity needs induce target CEO to sacrifice takeover premiums, one 
would expect that this argument would have some implications in predicting the success 
probability of a takeover offer given that the management of the target firm usually plays an 
important role in the negotiations. Based on the liquidity argument, I expect managers 
motivated by liquidity concerns to exert more effort in the takeover deal to ensure the 
completion of the deal, thus I predict a positive relationship between the equity-based 
incentives of managers and the likelihood of the successful takeover.  
The predictions of liquidity hypothesis are consistent with Holmstrom and 
Nalebuff’s (1992) theoretical work. In their model, they show that in the presence of non-
negligible shareholders, the marginal incentive of the shareholder to tender half of his 
shares for free is increasing in the ownership of the shareholder in order to increase the 
chance of success of the deal and to obtain the premium on the remaining half of their 
holdings. Moreover, Cai and Vijh (2004) argue and document evidence that acquisitions 
offer an effective exit mechanism for target CEOs to eliminate or reduce these liquidity 
constraints. 
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2.3. Acquirer Managerial Incentives and Takeover Wealth Gains 
2.3.1. Overview 
As discussed in the previous section, empirical evidence shows that the distribution 
of wealth gain in takeovers is in the favor of the target shareholders most of the time. In 
other words, target shareholders usually win, whereas the average net wealth gain accrued 
to the acquirer shareholders is zero or the acquirer do not lose at best.2 However, these 
results mask an important observation that there are acquisitions with highly positive returns 
and negative returns to the acquirer shareholders in the same sample. What differentiates a 
CEO who undertakes an acquisition, which decreases the acquiring firm’s value, from one 
who increases it?  
Similar to the discussion in the previous section for target CEOs, I also explore the 
effect of acquiring CEO’s equity incentives on takeover wealth gains. In this analysis, I also 
take into consideration his potential managerial objectives for the acquisition suggested in 
finance literature such as diversification (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, (1990)), which may 
shadow his equity–based incentives and induce him to deviate from maximization of 
shareholder’s wealth objective. For example, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) find 
results showing that if the target firm is in an unrelated business, this hurts the takeover 
returns of the acquiring firm shareholders negatively.  
A. Incentive Alignment 
According to incentive theory of equity-based compensation, a CEO whose wealth 
is significantly tied to his company’s share price will partially internalize the effects of his 
decisions on the firm value. In other words, since he will partially share both the losses and 
the gains accrued to the shareholders of the acquiring firm as a result of the acquisition 
                                                 
2 See Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988), Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) 
for an extensive review of wealth effects of M&As. 
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decision, he will have more incentives to identify better target candidates and opportunities 
to create more positive synergy, and to create more increase in acquiring firm value. 
Therefore, the incentive alignment hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between the 
equity-based incentives of the acquiring CEO and acquiring firm takeover wealth gains. 
B. Diversification 
I conjecture that as size of the equity portfolio of the acquiring manager, thus, his 
equity incentives increase, he is more likely to engage in acquisitions for the purpose of 
diversifying his portfolio rather than maximizing shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, I expect 
the relationship between the equity incentives of the acquiring manager and acquiring firm 
returns to be negative in the group of managers who are undertaking diversifying 
acquisitions.  
2.3.2. Relevant Studies 
 To the best of my knowledge, the most relevant study has been conducted by Datta, 
Datta, Raman (2001) examining the relationship between the structure of executive 
compensation and acquiring firm returns surrounding the deal announcement with a sample 
U.S. firms that acquired domestic firms over the period 1993-1998. They document a strong 
positive relation between “equity based compensation” (EBC) and stock price performance 
around the acquisition announcement, consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis. 
However, Datta et al. (2001) measure EBC as the ratio of option granted to total 
compensation received in the year prior to the acquisition announcement, ignoring the 
incentives coming from the options granted in the previous years and the stock holdings of 
CEO. I believe that this is an important omission and needs to be considered in order to 
appropriately account for managerial equity incentives. I modify their measure in order to 
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include the incentive effect of previous stock and option grants as well3. In this study, I use 
alignment measures that capture the incentive effects of all options and stock holdings 
portfolio of both acquiring and target CEO. This provides the opportunity to observe the 
overall effectiveness of equity incentives used in executive compensation schemes. 
 
3. Data Sources, Sample Formation and Variable Definition  
3.1. Data Sources and Sample Formation 
 
I use the Worldwide M&A Section of the Securities Data Company (SDC) database 
to construct a takeover sample. The sample period is restricted to the period from January 1, 
1994 to December 31, 2003, since executive compensation data is not available in the 
Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database before 1992. To start with, I identify 110,765 
M&A transactions between years 1994 to 2003 in SDC database. To be included in my 
takeover sample, I require the following: The transaction is listed as completed with an 
announcement date in the sample period; the target and acquirer are U.S. firms publicly 
traded on the AMEX; Nasdaq or NYSE; the transaction is identified as a “merger” or an 
“acquisition of majority interest” using SDC; the acquirer owns less than 20% of the target 
equity prior to the offer; the acquirer controls more than 50% of the target equity after the 
completion of the takeover; the acquirer and target firms have available stock return data 
around the takeover announcement listed on the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) file. Finally, a transaction is included if executive compensation data for the CEO 
of the acquirer and target firm is available in ExecuComp database for the year prior to the 
acquisition year. This database includes S&P 500, Midcap, and Smallcap index firms.  
                                                 
3 A more detailed discussion of the variables used in this study is given in Section 3. 
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At this point, I identify 834 acquisitions of which acquiring firm managers’ 
compensation data is available in ExecuComp data. Out of this sample, only 381 
acquisitions of which target firm managers’ compensation data is available in ExecuComp 
for the year prior to the announcement year. To increase the sample size for more powerful 
tests, out of a sample of 453 where the data is not available in ExecuComp, I obtain 
executive compensation data for 275 target managers of the acquisitions database from the 
firm’s annual proxy statement or 10-K filing, relating to the year before the takeover 
announcement date. The final sample consists of 656 successful acquisitions. (430 acquirer 
firms and 656 target firms). Using the same criteria above, I also identify a sample 104 
failed takeover offers between years 1994 and 2003 using SDC database. A takeover is 
identified as “failed” if the status of the offer is “withdrawn” in SDC database. 
I collect compensation measures of the CEOs of the target and acquiring firms 
which include salary, bonus, new stock options awarded, time to maturity of the options 
granted, Black-Scholes value of new options granted, stocks holdings, the value of in-the-
money exercisable/un-exercisable options holding, ownership from ExecuComp database. I 
collect the same variables except Black-Scholes value of new options granted from proxy 
statement or 10-K filing of the firm for the set of target managers for which compensation 
data is not available in ExecuComp. I compute the Black - Scholes value of new options 
granted for this set of target managers using the Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp Modified 
Black-Scholes Options Valuation Methodology4.  
I collect deal-specific and firm-specific factors from SDC and COMPUSTAT 
database. The factors I include are whether the acquirer’s and target’s businesses are in the 
same industrial category; the method of payment selected for the merger; whether the 
                                                 
4 See Appendix A for the details of computation of Black-Scholes Value of options. 
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merger was friendly or hostile; the number of bidders for the target firm; and whether the 
target’s and acquirer’s businesses are diversified. Market value of equity of the target and 
acquirer firms is measured one day prior to the event window. I collect the number of 
segments and sales of the segments in a firm from COMPUSTAT database for the year 
prior to the acquisition announcement year to compute the Herfindahl Index of the firm 
based on segment sales. 
3.2. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 reports data on acquisition characteristics. In the sample of 656 
successful acquisitions, there are 508 mergers and 148 tender offers, 629 friendly and 27 
hostile acquisitions consistent with the evidence of decreasing trend of hostile takeovers in 
the last decade. The method of payment is all cash in 187 acquisitions, all equity in 297 
acquisitions, and a combination of both in 175 acquisitions. 245 acquisitions are classified 
as related business takeovers if two-digit primary SIC industry codes are the same for the 
target and acquirer firms and 411 acquisitions are classified as unrelated business takeovers 
if they are not the same. In 42 acquisitions, there is more than one bidder and in 614 
acquisitions, there is only one bidder. The distribution of the sample deal characteristics is 
similar to the other studies in takeovers. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports data on firm characteristics. The mean (median) acquirer 
firm market capitalization is $22.6 (5.5) billion, the mean (median) target firm market 
capitalization is $2.5 (0.5) billion and mean (median) the relative market capitalization of 
the firms is 23.32% (11.76%). This suggests that target firms are significantly smaller than 
    21
the acquirer firms. Governance Index is Gompers, Ishii, Metrick’s (2003) governance 
measure5, which contains a count of various anti-takeover provisions6. 
The mean (median) diversification level of target firms measured by the number of 
four digit SIC codes reported on SDC for the firm in the acquisition year is (3.22) 3 and the 
mean (median) diversification level for acquirer firms is 4.89 (5). The mean (median) 
Herfindahl Index based on segment sales for target firms is 0.85 (1.00), whereas the mean 
(median) Herfindahl Index for acquirer firms is 0.70 (0.75). Given that acquirer firms are 
larger than target firms are, I observe a higher diversification level in this group based on 
both number of SIC codes and Herfindahl Index variables. Out of 656 acquisitions, only 
606 targets and 599 acquirers find a match in the COMPUSTAT database for the year prior 
to the acquisition year. Therefore, I used these sub-samples in my analysis where I included 
Hefindahl Index as a variable. Mean (median) Firm Specific Risk 1, which is industry-
adjusted standard deviation of market model residuals using median value in the industry is 
1.95% (0%) for target firms and –2.16%  (-2.01%) for acquirer firms. On the other hand, 
Firm Specific Risk 2, which is industry-adjusted standard deviation of market model 
residuals using value-weighted industry mean is 2.20% (0.78%) for target firms and 1.65% 
(0.58%) for acquirer firms. Table 2 presents the distribution of acquisitions by years in 
which the deal is announced and the average deal value for that year. The yearly trend in the 
number of deals is consistent with broader trend in the merger activity over the sample 
period, especially with a high merger activity between 1997 and 2000. 
 
                                                 
5 Gompers, Ishii, Metrick’s (2003) constructs “Governance Index” for each firm and year by adding one point 
for every provision that reduces shareholders rights. They look at a sum of 24 provisions, which includes 22 
charter provisions, bylaw provisions, firm-level rules, and state laws.  
6 For missing values of “Governance Index” for a firm in a given year, I use the Governance Index value of 
that firm for the closest year available in the data file. If there is no data available for a firm, I use the median 
value of the Governance Index in the takeover sample for that firm. 
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3.3. Construction of Variables 
3.3.1. Equity-Based Executive Incentives (EBI) 
A. Executive Compensation Components 
To measure the equity-based managerial incentives; both stock and option holdings 
of CEOs of the acquiring and target firms were collected from Standard and Poor’s 
ExecuComp database and manually from Proxy Statements or 10-K filings for the year 
immediately preceding the acquisition announcement year. Compensation data is classified 
into seven compensation categories identified in the Summary Compensation Tables of 
proxy statements. Total compensation consists of all seven components reported in the 
proxy statement.7 ExecuComp separately computes the present value of the options granted 
to executives using a modified Black Scholes method. The following items are collected for 
the CEO of each acquirer and target firm in the sample for the year prior to the acquisition 
announcement: a) Salary and bonus; b) number, expiration date and exercise prices of stock 
options granted; c) number of shares of stock held; d) number of previous stock options 
held; e) the volatility of the stock price; e) the average dividend payout ratio for the last 3 
years. 
The market value of managers’ stockholdings is valued using the stock price at the 
end of the fiscal year as provided in ExecuComp database for the year preceding the 
acquisition announcement. To compute the market value of previously granted stock 
options I use the Black-Scholes options pricing formula. 8    
Previous studies face a significant difficulty when measuring the manager’s equity 
incentives. One of the problems is equity–linked portion of the compensation being 
                                                 
7 Annual compensation consists of salary, bonus, and other annual compensation. Other annual compensation 
includes restricted stocks granted, stock options granted, long-term incentive plan payouts, and other 
compensation. 
8 See Appendix A for the open form of the formula, parameter assumptions used in calculation and details of 
the computation of the market value of the options granted and previous options. 
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cumulative in its incentive effects through years whereas the remaining portion of the 
compensation is not. As emphasized by Yermack (1995), I believe that it would not be 
appropriate to use the fraction of the value of the stocks and options granted in one year to 
the total compensation in that year as a measure of equity incentives. This measure neglects 
the incentive effects of the previous options, restricted, and unrestricted stocks granted to 
the manager in the previous years as a part of compensation plan. In addition to that, Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) suggest that in analyzing executive equity incentives, it is more 
appropriate to use the incentives that come from the stock and options portfolio of the 
manager. In addition, Hall and Liebmann (1998) argue that using only pay-performance 
measures to proxy for the alignment of the manager, while ignoring managerial differences 
in wealth and risk preferences may generate misleading inferences.  
B. Proxies for Managerial Equity Incentives 
Since there is no complete consensus in measuring equity incentives of managers, I 
construct three different measures in an attempt to capture different aspects of the issue. I 
use the pay performance sensitivity of the equity portfolio of target and acquirer firm’s CEO 
in the year prior acquisition announcement date as my first measure of equity-based 
managerial incentives. The sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio to the firm value is computed 
as the dollar increase in equity portfolio of the manager for $100 increase in firm value 
following Jensen and Murphy (1990). I call this measure Equity-based Incentives (EBI) and 
it is computed as follows: 
 
number of shares held 
number of options held on 
company’s stock 
 
EBI1= ( + X ∂ V/∂ P ) X100 
 number of outstanding 
shares 
 number of outstanding shares 
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where ∂ V /∂ P<=1 is the dollar change in the Black-Scholes value of the option for $1 
change in the stock price.  
As alternative measures, I also construct two other variables suggested in the 
literature as measures of equity incentives of managers (For example see Agrawal, 
Mandelker (1987), Hall and Liebman (1998)). The second incentive measure, EBI2, is the 
ratio of the total market value of stocks plus options holdings of the manager to the total 
compensation in the year prior to the year of the acquisition announcement. The third 
measure, EBI3, is the ratio of the total market value of stocks plus options holdings of a 
CEO to the sum of cash and bonus payments in the year prior to the year of acquisition 
announcement.  
C. Summary Statistics 
  In Panel A and B of Table 3, I present the compensation and incentive measures and 
equity holdings of target and acquirer firm CEOs in the sample. In all compensation 
measures except ownership and equity-based incentives, I observe a higher level of 
compensation for acquirer CEOs than those of target CEOs consistent with evidence that 
compensation level is higher in large firms (Smith and Watts, 1992, Hall and Liebman, 
1998). The mean (median) salary for target CEOs is $466 (400) thousand, and the mean 
(median) salary for acquirer CEO is $719 (684) thousand which is about 55% (mean) more 
than target CEOs. The bonus and value of option grants components of acquirer CEO are 
about five times (median) the corresponding compensation components of the target CEO. 
The mean (median) total compensation for target CEOs is $3.2 (1.3) million, whereas the 
mean (median) total compensation for acquirer CEO is 8.5 (3.9) million which is 3.11 
(median) times the target CEO. On the other hand, while 26% of the target CEO 
compensation comes from the sum of restricted stock and options grants, almost half of 
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acquirer CEO compensation comes from equity components suggesting that the differential 
compensation of these two groups comes from mainly from equity grants. Similarly, on 
average the value of options portfolio (including unexercised previous grants) of acquirer 
CEO is 4.3 times the value options portfolio and the value of stock portfolio is 3.3 times the 
value stock portfolio of the target CEO.  
On the other hand, the mean (median) acquirer CEO ownership is 1.79 (0.18)%, 
whereas the mean (median) target CEO ownership is 3.69 (0.5). The mean (median) Equity-
Based Incentives (EBI) for acquirer CEO measured as the dollar change in the value of 
CEO’s equity portfolio for a $100 change in the shareholders’ wealth, is $2.70 (0.86) and 
the mean (median) EBI for target CEO is $5.37 (2.38). These results are consistent with the 
evidence of decreasing managerial ownership and pay-performance sensitivities in larger 
firms (Baker and Hall, 2004).  
3.3.2. Takeover Wealth Gains 
A. Measurement 
I use two measures to capture the wealth gains of the target firm shareholders: 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and Abnormal Dollar Returns around the acquisition 
announcement date. Though the literature has focused on CARs, these returns do not 
capture the change in wealth of acquirer or target firm shareholders as noted by Malastesta 
(1983). For target and acquirer firm shareholders, the same percentage return changes their 
wealth more if the target is a large firm rather than small. I use the conventional event study 
methodology to calculate the acquirer and target firm CARs (CARA and CART 
respectively). The acquisition is defined to be a contest if there are more than one bid within 
365 days of the first bid for the target firm. Target firm CARs are computed over a window 
that starts 5 days before the announcement date of first bid in the contest and ends on the 
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announcement date of the successful bid. Similarly, the event window for the acquirers 
starts 5 days before the first bid of the successful acquiring firm and ends on the 
announcement date of the successful bid. CARs are measured relative to a CRSP value-
weighted market model regression. Returns of 240 days through 300th and 60th days prior to 
the announcement date were utilized to estimate the market model parameters. Firms are 
included in the sample if they have at least 100 daily returns available in the estimation 
period. 
 Following Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), I compute the dollar denominated 
wealth gains accrued to the target and acquirer firms’ shareholders through multiplying 
cumulative abnormal return by the market capitalization of the firm measured one day 
before the starting date of the event window. These computed wealth gains are then adjusted 
using CPI Index to be expressed in 2003 dollars. 
ACQWEALTH = CARA * ACQ_SIZE   (2) 
TARWEALTH = CART * TAR_SIZE   (3) 
COMWEALTH = ACQWEALTH + TARWEALTH (4) 
B. Summary Statistics 
In Table 4, the abnormal returns measured over the event window for target and 
acquirer firms are reported. In Panel A, the median CAR is 20.03%, -1.98%, 1.02% for the 
target, acquirer, and combined firm, respectively. These results are consistent with the prior 
documented evidence (e.g. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001). In Panel B, the median 
abnormal dollar return is $102.50, -$50.31, $37.62 million for the target, acquiring, and 
combined firm. 
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3.3.3. Proxies for Target CEO’s Diversification Driven-Liquidity Needs 
I adopt two different approaches to estimate the diversification driven-liquidity 
needs of target managers. The first one is diversification level of the target firm prior to the 
takeover and the second one is the firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk of the target firm. 
A. Diversification Level of the Target Firm 
 I use two alternative measures to proxy the diversification level of the target firm 
prior to the takeover: Number of businesses the firm is operating in and the Herfindahl 
index based on segment sales9. The diversification level of the target firm is measured using 
the count of the 4-digit SIC codes as listed in SDC database for the target firm in the year of 
the acquisition announcement. Herfindahl Index is as the sum of squares of segment sales 
divided by the total sales of the firm. Herfindahl Index provides a measure of concentration 
of segment sales and decreases with increasing degree of diversification. If the target 
manager is holding an equity portfolio of a focused firm, he is more likely to be in need of 
liquidity to diversify compared to a target manager of a diversified firm. Using the median 
value of diversification measure, I divide the sample into two groups of diversified and 
undiversified firms. The median value of diversification measure (number of 4-digit SIC 
codes) is 3 in the takeover sample used in this study. Specifically, if the diversification level 
of the firm is below 3, it is categorized as an undiversified firm. If the diversification 
measure is above or equal to median, the firm is categorized as a diversified firm 
(Diversification Dummy). On the other hand, the median value of Herfindahl Index is one 
in the target firm sample10. According to this, the median target firm has only one 
                                                 
9 Berger and Ofek (1999) use Herfindahl Index based on segment sales instead of the number of segments. 
10 The sample reduces to 606 observations when I include Herfindahl Index as a variable, since 50 target firms 
in the original sample are not covered by COMPUSTAT in the year prior to the takeover announcement. 
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segment11. If the Herfindahl Index is lower than 1, the firm is categorized as a diversified 
firm (Herfindahl Index Dummy), otherwise it is categorized as a diversified firm. 
B. Firm-Specific Risk of the Target Firm 
In addition to the diversification level of the target firm, I also use the firm-specific 
risk of the target firm relative to its industry median as a measure of the diversification 
driven-liquidity needs of the target manager. Following Jin (2002) I compute the mean 
squared error from the market model regression as a measure of the firm-specific risk of the 
firm. I computed two different firms-specific risk measures to proxy for the diversification 
needs of the target manager. The first one is the firm-specific risk of the target firm relative 
to the median firm in the industry (Firm Specific Risk 1). The second one is the firm-
specific risk of the target firm relative to the value-weighted industry average (Firm Specific 
Risk 2). The industry is defined at the 2-digit SIC code level of the primary business of the 
target firm. I require that that there are at least 5 firms in the industry to include the 
observation in later regression analyses. This decreases the sample size to 609 where firm-
specific risk is included as a variable in the regression analysis. If the target firm has a high 
firm-specific risk relative to its industry, then the target manager is more likely to be in need 
of liquidity to diversify his equity portfolio compared to the target manager which a has a 
low firm-specific risk relative to its industry. Therefore, if the target firm has a higher value 
of firm specific risk than median value of the industry or the value-weighted average of the 
industry then the firm is categorized as undiversified, otherwise, it is categorized as 
diversified firm.  
                                                 
11 Alternatively, I also repeat the analysis in this study using the number of segments of the firm reported in 
COMPUSTAT database instead of the number of 4-digit SIC codes reported for the firm in SDC. 
COMPUSTAT stops to include the majority of the target firms in the sample for the year the takeover is 
announced. Only 19 % of the takeover sample is covered by COMPUSTAT in the takeover announcement 
year. Therefore, I used the number of segments variable for the year prior to the takeover announcement. I find 
similar results. 
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3.3.5. Control Variables  
Several firm-specific and deal–specific factors potentially affect the wealth gains 
(losses) from mergers and acquisition as documented in the literature. Among many other 
proposed variables, there is abundant evidence that the mood of the payment (hostile or 
friendly), the method of the payment (cash, equity), the type of the offer (tender offer, 
merger), the diversification of target and acquiring firms, and the relative size of the target 
firm to the acquiring firm and governance index of the target firm have a significant effect 
on the real gains accrued to the shareholders. 
A. Deal Characteristics 
Hostile acquisitions create large positive abnormal returns for the target firm, and 
large negative returns for the acquiring firm (For example, see Goergen and Renneboog, 
(2004)). I use dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the mood of the acquisition is hostile, 0 if 
it is friendly. An acquisition transaction is classified as hostile if the initial reaction variable 
in the SDC database is identified either as hostile or unsolicited. There is well documented 
evidence that both the acquirer’s and target’s share prices respond more positively at the 
time of the announcement, if the method of payment is cash in an acquisition rather than 
equity.12 I use a dummy variable that equals 1, if the consideration paid is all stock, 0 
otherwise.  
The announcement of tender offers are also associated with higher returns to target 
and lower returns to acquiring firm relative to the merger announcements. (Jensen and 
Ruback (1983), Loughran and Vijh (1997)). I use a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
offer is a tender offer, 0 if it is a merger. Industry relatedness has also been offered as a 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1987), Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990), Amihud, 
Lev and Travlos (1990), Peterson and Peterson (1991), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller (2002). 
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partial explanation for abnormal returns in acquisitions (For example, Morck et al., 1990). 
In this study, I defined industrial relatedness using the first two digits of SIC codes of 
acquiring and target companies. If the acquiring and target firms share the same numbers in 
the first two digits of their primary SIC codes, the acquisition is considered as related, 
otherwise it is considered unrelated. 
B. Firm Characteristics 
The relative size of the target to the size of acquirer is potentially an indicator of the 
wealth changes (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1983), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Fuller, 
Netter, and Stegemoller (2002)). Target size/Acquirer size is the ratio of the market 
capitalization of the target firm to that of acquirer firm. Market capitalization of each firm 
equals share price one day before the starting day of the event window multiplied by the 
number common shares outstanding on the same date. I also include a dummy variable, 
which equals 1 if there are more than one bidder in the deal for the target. At a basic level, if 
there are multiple bidders competing to acquire the target, the competition effect is likely to 
increase the premium paid for the target firm.  
I also control for the degree of diversification of the target and acquiring firms prior 
to the takeover. The degree of diversification is proxied by the number of SIC industry 
codes listed for the firm in SDC database (Kale, Kini and Ryan, (2003)). In addition, I use 
Gompers et.al.’s Governance Index of the target firm as a control variable. Governance 
Index provides a measure of the takeover defense mechanism the target firm adapts. By 
design, these defense mechanisms make the transfer of the corporate control more difficult 
for the acquiring firm. Thus, managers who are protected by these provisions are more 
likely to resist a takeover offer increasing the takeover premium for the target firm. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Target Managerial Incentives and Target Firm Wealth Gains Surrounding 
Takeover Announcements 
I first examine the effect of equity-based incentives of target managers on the 
takeover wealth gains for the target shareholders. For the 656 completed acquisitions 
sample, I run multivariate regressions of target wealth gains on target CEO’s managerial 
incentives, firm and deal characteristics. 
The dependent variable in the regressions is either the target firm CARs or the 
cumulative abnormal dollar returns. I use several control variables documented to affect the 
acquisition abnormal returns. The control variables include the governance index of the 
target firm, the attitude of the takeover (hostile or friendly), the mode of the payment (all 
stock or combination), the acquisition technique (tender offer or merger), relatedness of the 
business, competition in the bidding environment (single bidder, multiple bidder), the 
diversification of the target and acquiring firm, the size of the target and relative size of the 
target and acquiring firms. I also include year dummies to capture the possible effect of 
changing market conditions during the analysis period. I use OLS regressions when the 
dependent variable is CARs and median regressions when the dependent variable is 
abnormal dollar returns to deal with high skewness in the distribution of this variable. 13 
A. Are Target CEOs Aligned with the Interest of Shareholders? 
In Table 5, I report the results on the relationship between equity incentives of target 
manager and target firm takeover wealth gains. According to the incentive alignment 
                                                 
13 If the data are skewed and non-normal, quantile regression methodology provides a way to get more robust 
estimates than classic OLS estimates. Median regression minimizes the sum of absolute deviations instead of 
the sum of squared deviations. See Koenker and Basset (1982) for a discussion of the properties of median 
regressions. See Jin (2002), Barnes and Hughes (2002) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999, 2003) for 
motivations to use Quantile Regressions in finance research. 
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hypothesis, a target CEO with high equity-based incentives is more likely to behave in the 
interests of the target shareholders thus, increase the abnormal returns of the acquisition that 
accrues to the target shareholders. All specifications include year dummies to capture the 
time trend during the sample period. These year dummies are suppressed to save space.  
In Table 5, model 1 and 4 test the relationship between target abnormal returns 
(CAR in Model 1 and dollar returns in Model 4) and EBI of the target CEO in the sample of 
completed takeovers. In both models, the coefficient of EBI is statistically insignificant. 
Although this evidence is not against the incentive alignment hypothesis, it encourages 
further investigation for the alternative liquidity explanation. Liquidity argument predicts a 
negative relationship between equity incentives of managers and takeover wealth gains, 
whereas incentive alignment predicts a positive one. Therefore, these results are not 
surprising, if there is more than one explanation behind the behavior of the target manager 
in takeovers.  
B. Diversified versus Undiversified Target CEOs 
To explore the effect of target managers’ equity incentives of on acquisition returns 
further, I consider the potentially different behavior of target managers in diversified and 
undiversified firms. I investigate the effect of hypothesized diversification driven-liquidity 
needs of managers on target wealth gains. Since the manager of the diversified firm already 
holds an equity portfolio of a diversified firm, I conjecture that he will have less need to 
liquidate his equity portfolio through the acquisition process compared to a manager who 
holds an equity portfolio in an undiversified firm. Therefore, I interact the EBI variable with 
dummy variables defined as 1 if the firm is categorized as diversified using diversification 
level and Herfindahl Index of the target, 0 otherwise (Models 2,3, 5 and 6 in Table 5). If 
liquidity argument were true, I would expect a negative sign on the EBI variable in these 
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models, which shows the effect of equity incentives of managers in undiversified firms on 
target returns. A positive coefficient on the interaction terms would be consistent with the 
incentive alignment argument 
The results show that the coefficient of EBI is statistically significant and negative in 
all models 2, 3, 5 and 6 in Table 5, suggesting that primary motivation of target managers is 
the liquidity need in undiversified firms dominating the alignment effect from equity 
incentives. In addition, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term of EBI and 
diversification dummy in Models 2 and 5 is significantly positive at 1% and 5% levels 
respectively. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term of EBI and Herfindahl Index 
is positive and significant at 10% level in model 3, positive but not significant at 
conventional levels in model 6. These results are consistent with the incentive alignment 
explanation for the managers in diversified firms. 
C. Target Firms with High Firm-specific Risk vs. Low Firm-Specific Risk 
In Table 6, I report the results of the regression analysis using the firm-specific risk 
interaction terms instead of diversification level. A higher firm-specific risk provides more 
incentive to the target manager to liquidate his equity portfolio if the liquidity argument is 
correct. Firm Specific Risk 1 dummy variable is defined as1 if the target firm has a lower 
firm-specific risk than the median value in its industry, 0 otherwise. Firm Specific Risk 2 
dummy variable is defined as1 if the target firm has a lower firm-specific risk than the 
value-weighted firm-specific risk in its industry, 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficient of 
EBI variable in all models in Table 6 are negative but only significant at 10% levels in 
Models 3 and 4, where the dependent variable is dollar returns. These results provide weak 
evidence that the target manager’s EBI and target firm wealth gains are negatively related in 
firms where the firm-specific risk is higher relative to the industry, consistent with the 
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liquidity argument. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients of interaction terms of EBI 
and firms specific risk dummy variables are positive in the first three models but not 
significant at conventional levels.  
Overall, the results provide evidence that target firm returns around acquisition 
announcement date are decreasing in EBI of the target CEO in undiversified firms, 
increasing in EBI of the target CEO in diversified firms. The results are very strong when 
the diversification level (measured either by number of businesses the target firm is 
operating in or Herfindahl Index based on segment sales) is used a measure of the liquidity 
needs of the target manager. The analysis provides weaker evidence for the liquidity 
argument when firm-specific risk is used a measure of the liquidity needs of the target 
manager. This evidence is consistent with the liquidity hypothesis in explaining the link 
between managerial incentives and takeover announcement returns of the target firm in 
more focused firms. It also appears that the incentive alignment argument holds for the 
CEOs in diversified firms but does not hold for the CEOs in focused firms.  
4.2. Acquirer Managerial Incentives and Acquirer Firm Wealth Gains Surrounding 
Takeover Announcements 
In a takeover transaction, the personal wealth of the acquirer CEO is affected by the 
acquirer takeover returns, since the value of his equity portfolio is linked to the stock price 
of the acquirer firm. On the other hand, acquirer manager who holds an undversified 
portfolio of his firm’s stock may undertake diversifying acquisitions at the expense of 
acquirer shareholders in order to reduce his risk.  I now investigate the link between equity-
based incentives of the acquirer CEO and takeover wealth gains accrued to the acquirer 
shareholders. For the 656 completed acquisitions sample, I run multivariate regressions of 
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acquirer wealth gains on acquirer CEO’s managerial incentives, firm and deal 
characteristics. 
I use OLS regressions when the dependent variable is CARs and median regressions 
when the dependent variable is abnormal dollar returns. All specifications include year 
dummies to capture the time trend during the sample period. These year dummies are 
suppressed to save space. 
A. Are Acquirer CEOs aligned with the interests of shareholders? 
In Table 7, I document the results of the regressions that analyze the link between 
EBI of acquirer CEO and acquirer firm wealth gains in takeovers. According to the 
incentive alignment theory, I expect that takeover returns of acquiring firm increase in the 
EBI of acquirer CEO. The dependent variable is acquirer CARs in models 1 and 2 and 
cumulative abnormal dollar returns in models 3 and 4. In models 1 and 3, I investigate a 
direct effect between EBI variable and acquirer returns. According these results, acquirer 
EBI does not seem to affect acquirer returns significantly. This fails to support the findings 
of Datta et al. (2001). They find evidence for a positive relationship between acquirer CARs 
and an equity incentive measure defined as the ratio of value of granted options of CEO to 
the total compensation of the CEO of the acquiring firm one year prior to the acquisition 
year.   
B. Acquirer CEOs in Diversifying versus Related Business Acquisitions 
In model 2 and 4 (Table 7), I analyze the effect of EBI for managers who undertake 
acquisitions in a related business, using an interaction term of EBI with a related business 
dummy. This dummy is defined as one if the two-digit primary SIC codes of target and 
acquiring firms are the same, and 0 otherwise. An estimated negative coefficient of EBI in 
this model would support the argument that acquirer manager is more likely to undertake 
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value-destroying acquisition decisions in the pursuit of diversifying his equity portfolio, as 
the level of his EBI increases. On the other hand, a positive coefficient of the interaction 
term of EBI and related business dummy would support the incentive alignment argument 
for the managers who acquire a target in the same business. Although the results from 
model 2 provide findings consistent with these two predictions, the estimated coefficients 
are not at conventional significance levels.   
4.3. Equity-based Managerial Incentives and the Success Probability of Takeovers 
 In this section, I investigate the effect of managerial incentives on the likelihood of 
the takeover success to provide further evidence in distinguishing between the liquidity, 
incentive alignment for target managers. When the issue is examined from the perspective 
of target firm’s CEO, three main attitudes he may take when a takeover bid arrives, become 
evident. He may try to defeat the bid, negotiate aggressively to receive a better premium or 
negotiate passively, and be indifferent to the outcome of the takeover bid. There are several 
factors that potentially influence the attitude of the target firm’s CEO to the bid such as his 
future employment (e.g. losing his job or a new position in the combined firm); the personal 
benefits (e.g. golden parachute, bonuses, liquidation of stock options, the premium for his 
own shares in the firm); and pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses (e.g. loss of compensation, 
prestige) in case of a successful acquisition. CEO of the target firm will choose his attitude 
to the bid considering the trade-off between the personal benefits and costs as a result of a 
possible successful acquisition. Consequently, his attitude towards the bid as well the level 
of effort to influence the outcome will affect the probability of the success of the 
acquisition. In this framework, I intend to analyze the marginal effect of the equity-based 
incentives of target CEO on the likelihood of a successful bid. 
 
    37
A. Predictions 
What are the possible effects of equity incentives of a target CEO in determining his 
attitude towards the bid? First, I argue that as equity based incentives of target CEO 
increase, he is more likely to work towards a successful takeover, as this would maximize 
his personal benefits. In fact, in a theoretical framework, Holmstrom and Nalebuff (1992) 
showed that as the ownership of the target manager increases, he is more likely to tender his 
shares due to two reasons: receiving the value increase from the sale of his shares and 
increased chance of success since he can affect the outcome of the takeover as a marginal 
shareholder. Consequently, his willingness to negotiate with the bidder in positive terms 
tends to increase the probability of a successful takeover. Consistent with this argument, 
previous research provides evidence that target manager ownership is significantly higher in 
successful offers as compared to unsuccessful offers (Song and Walking (1993), Duggal and 
Millar (1994)). These arguments are consistent with the liquidity and incentive alignment 
hypotheses and predict that higher equity incentives of the target manager positively affect 
the likelihood of the takeover. On the other hand, we are more likely to observe failed 
takeovers bids among target managers who attract higher and eventually successful bids or 
reject a bid because it is very low for the target firm and waits for a higher bid to arrive. The 
target managers are expected to behave in this way if they are aligned with the interests of 
the target shareholders through equity incentives. Therefore, I expect the positive 
relationship between EBI of the target manager and success probability of the takeover to be 
less pronounced if the incentive alignment is the dominant explanation behind the behavior 
of the target manager. 
In order to examine the effect of target and acquirer managers’ equity incentives on 
the success rate of a takeover offer, in this section I conduct logistic regressions to estimate 
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the takeover success probability using a sample of 104 failed takeovers identified in SDC 
database between years 1994-2003, in addition to 656 completed takeovers over the same 
period. Table 10 describes the results from this analysis. The dependent variable is equal to 
1 if it is a successful takeover, and 0 if it is a failed one.   
B. Results  
I find that in the full sample (Model 1 in Table 8) the effect of target managerial 
incentives increase the probability of a completed takeover deal with a significance level of 
10%, consistent with the liquidity and incentive alignment arguments.  
In order to investigate this further, in models 2, 3, 4 and 5 in Table 8, I distinguish 
the effect for the managers in undiversified and diversified firms by using an interaction 
term of EBI and diversification dummy variables.  
The results show that the effect of managerial incentives stays positive and 
significant in models 1-3 and positive but not at conventional levels in models 4 and 5 for 
the managers in more focused target firms providing additional support for liquidity 
argument. The coefficient of interaction term is negative, however not significant at 
conventional levels in all five models. This suggests that for diversified target firm 
managers, EBI is less effective on the likelihood of takeover success relative to the 
undiversified firms. In summary, the evidence in this analysis provides further support for 
the liquidity argument to explain the behavior of target managers in undiversified firms in 
takeover offers.   
 According to the results in Table 8, EBI of the acquirer CEO affects the success 
probability of the takeover negatively, in agreement with the incentive alignment 
hypothesis. The interaction of this term with related business did not provide any 
statistically significant relationship for the effect of EBI of the acquirer CEO on the 
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likelihood of the takeover success. The models including these interaction terms are not 
reported here to save the number of models presented in Table 8. 
4.4. Unsuccessful Bidders in Multi-bidder Takeover Deals 
In this section, I conduct additional tests to investigate the influence of acquirer 
CEO’s equity incentives on acquisition decisions. Inspired by the similar analyses in Kale, 
Kini, Ryan’s (2003) study, I conjecture that a CEO who is aligned with the interest of 
shareholders is more likely to complete (withdraw from) a wealth-increasing (wealth-
decreasing) takeover. On the other hand, the likelihood of completing a wealth-decreasing 
takeover is expected to be higher among CEOs whose primary motivation is to benefit from 
diversification effect on his equity portfolio by undertaking unrelated business acquisitions.  
To test these arguments, I identify 60 matched takeover bids (30 successful, 30 
withdrawn) out of 42 multi-bidder takeovers in my initial sample14. I conduct logistic 
regressions and report results in Table 9 to analyze the effect of acquirer CEO’s EBI on the 
complete/withdraw decisions in multi-bidder takeovers. In Models 1 and 2 (Table 9), the 
dependent variable is one for the successful bidder and zero for the unsuccessful bidder if 
the announcement wealth effect for the successful bidder is positive. The dependent variable 
is zero for the successful bidder and one for the unsuccessful bidder if the wealth effect for 
the successful bidder is negative. In Models 3 and 4, the dependent variable is one if the 
wealth effect for the bidder is positive (successful or unsuccessful), zero otherwise.   
In this framework, a positive relationship between the EBI variable and the 
dependent variable in the logistic regressions would be consistent with the incentive 
alignment hypothesis for the acquirer CEOs. On the other hand, I expect this relationship to 
                                                 
14 Out of 42 multi-bidder takeovers identified earlier, 12 observations are dropped due to missing data. For 
these 12 multi-bidder successful takeovers, executive compensation data is not available for the unsuccessful 
bidder(s) in the contest. No contest includes more than two bidders in this sub-sample of 30 contests. 
    40
be negative in the subgroup of diversifying acquirer CEOs, if diversification argument is 
true. Therefore, I expect a negative sign on the EBI variable and a positive sign in front of 
the interaction term of EBI and Related Business Dummy in Models 2 and 4. 
In Table 9, the estimated coefficients of EBI (negative) and interaction term of EBI 
(positive) are consistent with the predictions only in Model 4, however, not at conventional 
significance levels. In all other specifications, the results also fail to provide statistical 
significance for the coefficients of EBI terms. Given the previous results for the acquirer 
CEOs in this study, this is not surprising. Overall, all tests in this study do not provide any 
evidence for the incentive alignment and diversification arguments for acquirer CEOs. 
4.5. Alternative Measures of EBI 
The appropriate measure of equity incentives of managers remains a question in 
finance literature. In this section, I repeat the analysis above using two alternative measures 
of equity-based incentives of managers to investigate if the results are robust to different 
incentive measures. The first one, EBI2, is defined as the ratio of the total market value of 
equity holdings of a manager to the total compensation in the year prior to the year of the 
acquisition announcement. The second one, EBI3 is defined as the ratio of the total market 
value of equity of a manager to the sum of cash and bonus payments in the year prior to the 
year of acquisition announcement.  
Table 10 reports the results of the regressions of target CARs on these two 
alternative EBI variables. In models 1 to 4, where the equity incentive measurement is 
EBI2, I document very similar results reported before though weaker. The coefficient of 
EBI2 variable is significant and negative in the first three models and the interaction term of 
EBI and diversification dummy shows some positive effect on target CARs with a 
significance level of 10% in model 2. In models 5 to 8, I document the analysis repeated 
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using equity incentive measure EBI3. The coefficient of EBI 3 variable is negative, 
significant in models 6 and 7 and the coefficient of interaction term is positive and 
significant in model 6. 
Table 11 reports the results of the regressions of acquirer CARs on these two 
alternative EBI variables. In consistent with my previous results, I do not document 
statistically significant effect of EBI on acquirer returns using these two alternative 
definitions of equity incentives. Based on the findings documented in Tables 10 and 11, I 
conclude that documented findings are robust to the alternative definitions of EBI suggested 
in the literature.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
In this study, I examine the impact of managerial incentives of target and acquirer 
CEOs on the wealth gains of target and acquirer firm shareholders, respectively, around 
takeover announcement date, using a sample of 656 successful and 104 failed U.S. based 
acquisitions that occur during the period 1994-2003. In addition to the incentive alignment 
argument, in this paper, I also consider potential impact of diversification driven-liquidity 
needs of managers on the on the effectiveness of incentive pay.   
Overall, I find evidence that takeover wealth gains for the target shareholders are 
decreasing in the equity-based incentives of the target manager in undiversified firms, 
consistent with the liquidity hypothesis. However, in cases, where liquidity need is less 
likely to be an issue (in diversified firms), managerial incentives have a positive effect on 
the target wealth gains supporting incentive alignment argument. In addition, I also find that 
the probability of takeover success is increasing in the incentives of the target managers in 
the full sample of successful and failed takeovers consistent with liquidity argument. 
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However, the results suggest that this effect may be weaker for the managers in diversified 
firms.  
Based on these findings, I conclude that the liquidity hypothesis is a more likely 
explanation for the behavior of target managers in less diversified target firms, while the 
incentive alignment hypothesis appears to dominate the liquidity argument in diversified 
firms. In addition, in my analysis I did not find any evidence supporting the incentive 
argument for acquirer managers, inconsistent with Datta et al.’s (2001) findings. 
    43
 
REFERENCES 
Aggarwal, Rajesh K. and Andrew A. Samwick, 1999, The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The 
Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation, Journal of Political Economy 107, 65-
105. 
_____________, 2003, Why Do Managers Diversify Their Firms? Agency Reconsidered, 
Journal of Finance 18, 71-117.  
Agrawal, A. and G. Mandelker, 1987, Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and 
Financing Decisions, Journal of Finance 42, 823-837. 
Amihud, Y, Lev, B. and N. G. Travlos, 1990, Corporate Control and the Choice of 
Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, Journal of Finance 45, 
603-616. 
Andrade, G., M. Mitchell, and E. Stafford, 2001, New Evidence and Perspectives on 
Mergers, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 103-120. 
Asquith, P., R.F. Bruner, and D.W. Mullins, 1983, The Gains to Bidding Firms From 
Merger, Journal of Financial Economics 11, 121-139. 
______________, 1987, Merger Returns and the Form of Financing, Working Paper, 
Harvard University. 
Baker, George and Brian Hall, 2004, CEO Incentives and Firm Size, Journal of Labor 
Economics, October.  
Berger, Philip G. and Eli Ofek, 1995, Diversification's Effect on Firm Value, Journal of 
Financial Economics 37(1), 39-65. 
Berger, Philip G. and Eli Ofek, 1999, Causes and Consequences of Corporate Refocusing 
Programs, Review of Financial Studies 12, 311-345. 
Berkovitch, E. and M.P. Narayanan, 1990, Competition and the Medium of Exchange in 
Takeovers, Review of Financial Studies 3, 153-174. 
Bradley, Michael, Anand Desai, E. Han Kim, 1988, Synergistic Gains From Corporate 
Acquisitions and Their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring 
Firms, Journal of Financial Economics 21, 3-40. 
Borokhovich, Kenneth A., Kelly R. Brunarski, Robert Parrino, 1997, CEO Contracting and 
Antitakeover Amendements, Journal of Finance 52 (4), 1495-1517.  
    44
Cai, Jie and Anand M. Vijh, 2004, Incentive Effects of Illiquid Stock and Options Holdings 
of Target and Acquirer CEOs, Working Paper, The University of Iowa. 
Carline, Nicholas F., Linn, Scott C. and Pradeep K. Yadav, 2002, The Influence of 
Managerial Ownership on the Real Gains in Corporate Mergers and Market 
Revaluation of Merger Partners: Empirical Evidence, EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings 
Discussion Paper. http://ssrn.com/abstract=302606 
Comment, Robert and Greg A. Jarrell, 1995, Corporate Focus and Stock Returns, Journal of 
Financial Economics 37, 67-87. 
Core, J. and W. Guay, 2002, Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Options Portfolios 
and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility, Journal of Accounting Research 40, 
613-630. 
Datta, Sudip, Mai Iskandar-Datta, and Kartik Raman, 2001, Executive Compensation and 
Corporate Acquisition Decisions, Journal of Finance 56, 2299-2336. 
Duggal, R. and J.A. Millar, 1994, Institutional Investors, Anti-takeover Defenses and 
Success of Hostile Takeover Bids, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 34, 
387-402. 
Eckbo, B.E., R.M. Giammmarino and R.L. Heinkel, 1990, Asymmetric Information and the 
Medium of Exchange in Takeovers: Theory and Tests, Review of Financial Studies 
3, 651-675. 
Fishman, M.J., 1989, Pre-emptive Bidding and the Role of the Medium of Exchange in 
Acquisitions, Journal f Finance 44, 41-57. 
Fuller, K., J. Netter, and M. StegeMoller, 2002, What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell 
Us? Evidence from Firms That Make Many acquisitions, Journal of Finance, 1763-
1793. 
Goergen, M. and Luc Renneboog, 2004, Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic 
and Cross-border Takeover Bids, European Financial Management Journal 10(1), 
2004, 9-45.   
Gompers, Paul A., Joy L. Ishii and Andrew Metrick, 2003, Corporate Governance and 
Equity Prices . Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 1, pp. 107-155, 
February. 
Hall, Brian J. and Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 653-691. 
    45
Haugen, R. A. and L. W. Senbet, 1981, Resolving the agency problems of external capital 
through options, Journal  of Finance 36, 629-647. 
Holmstrom, Bengt and Barry Nalebuff, 1992, To the Raider Goes the Surplus? A 
reexamination of the Free-Rider Problem, Journal of Economics & Management 
Strategy, Vol. 1, Number 1, 37-62. 
Jarrell, Gregg, James Brickley and Jeffrey Netter, 1988, The Market for Corporate Control: 
The Empirical Evidence since 1980, Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, 49-68. 
Jensen, Michael and W. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: managerial behavior, agency 
costs, and ownership structure, Journal of Finance 3, 305-360. 
Jensen, Michael and Kevin Murphy, 1990, Performance Pay and Top-Management 
Incentives, Journal of Political Economy 98, 225-264. 
Jensen, Michael and Richard Ruback, 1983, The Market for Corporate Control, Journal of 
Financial Economics 11, 5-50. 
Jin, Li, 2002, CEO Compensation, Diversification, and Incentives, Journal of Financial 
Economics 66, 29-63. 
Lewellen, Wilbur G., Claudio Loderer and Ahron Rosenfeld, 1985, Merger Decisions and 
executive stock ownership in acquiring firms, Journal of Accounting and Economics 
7, 209-231. 
Loughran, Tim and Anand M. Vijh, 1997, Do Long-term Shareholders Benefit from 
Corporate Acquisitions?, Journal of Finance 52, 1765-1790. 
Kale, Jayant R., Omesh Kini and Harley E. Ryan, 2003, Financial Advisors and Shareholder 
Wealth Gains in Corporate Takeovers, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 38, 475-501. 
Koenker, R. and G.W. Bassett , 1978, Regression Quintiles, Econometrica 46, 33-50. 
Malatesta, P., 1983, The Wealth of Merger Activity and the Objective Function of Merging 
Firms, Journal of Financial Economics 11, 155-182. 
Moeller, Sara B., Frederik P. Schlingemann, and René M. Stulz, 2005, Wealth Destruction 
on a Massive Scale: A Study of Acquiring Firm Returns in the Merger Wave of the 
Llate 1990's, Journal of Finance 60, 757-782.  
Mulherin, J. Harold and Audra Boone, 2000, Comparing Acquisitions and Divestitures, 
Journal of Corporate Finance 6, 117-129. 
    46
Murphy, Kevin J., 1999, Executive Compensation, in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card 
(eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, North Holland. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny, 1988, Value Maximization and Acquisition 
Process, Journal of Economic Perspectives 27. 
_____________, 1989, Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific 
Investments, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 25, 123-139. 
Song, M.H., and R. Walking, 1993, The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Acquisition 
Attempts and Target Shareholder Wealth, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 28, 439-457. 
Peterson, D.R. and P.P. Peterson, 1991, The Medium of Exchange in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, Journal of Banking and Finance 15, 383-405. 
Yermack, David, 1995, Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively?, Journal 
of Financial Economics 39, 237-269. 
    47
 
Appendix A 
Calculating CEO Stock Option Incentives 
This appendix explains how I calculate the value of a single option and the value of the 
option portfolio of the CEO. 
1- Value of a single option 
I calculate the option value using Black-Scholes option pricing formula (Black and Scholes, 
1973). 
Option value = )()( )5.0(TZNXeZNSe rtdt σ−− −−  
Where )5.0(2 /)]2/()/[ln( TdrTXSZ σσ+−+=  
 S = price of the underlying stock 
X= exercise price of the option 
T= time to maturity in years 
R= log of risk-free interest rate 
σ = expected volatility of the stock returns over the life of the option 
N() = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
 
2 - Value of previous options portfolio of CEO 
Since ExecuComp does not provide exercise price and time to maturity variables for options 
granted before 1992, I compute fiscal year end value of option portfolio of CEO using the 
Core and Guay (2002) approximation method. First, using ExecuComp data, I calculate the 
potential gains from exercising all options at the fiscal year end. Using the number of 
exercisable and unexercisable options and total realizable gains, I compute the average 
exercise price separately for the portfolio of exercisable and unexercisable options. I use the 
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average of past 3 years dividend yield provided in ExecuComp and I set the maturity of the 
exercisable options to 3 years and the maturity of the unexercisable options 6 years. I then 
compute the Black-Scholes value of these values using these parameters and add this value 
to the value of options granted in that year. This sum is used as the total value of options 
portfolio of the CEO for the prior year of the acquisition announcement. 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Distribution and Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Acquisitions and Firms Characteristics 
1994-2003 
The sample consists of 656 completed acquisitions during the period January 1, 1994, to December 31, 2003 listed 
in SDC database. All acquirer firms and 381 of the target firms have executive compensation data listed in 
ExecuComp database. For 275 of the acquisitions the executive compensation data has been manually collected 
from the proxy statements of the target firms. Tender offers and mergers are transactions that are identified by SDC 
under acquisition technique variable. Hostile refers to the transactions that are identified by SDC either hostile or 
unsolicited. Related Acquisition refers to the transactions in which the target and acquirer firm have the same 
industry group as measured with first two-digits of primary SIC codes. The transaction is identified unrelated 
otherwise. Competition refers to the takeover deals in which there are more than one bidder for the target firm. 
Market Capitalization of the target and acquirer firms are measured 6 days before the acquisition announcement 
date. Relative Size is the ratio of the target market capitalization to the acquirer market capitalization. Acquirer 
(Target) Diversification is the number of the SIC Codes that the Acquiring (Target) Firm has during the year of the 
acquisition as reported in SDC. Governance Index is Gomper et.al's (2003) governance measure representing the 
total number of the anti-takeover provisions the target (acquiring) firm holds. Herfindahl Index is the sum of the 
squared segment sales of the firm divided by the total sales of the firm in the year prior to the takeover 
announcement year. Firm Specific Risk 1 is the standard deviation of residuals from market model regression 
relative to the median value in the 2-digit industry level. Firm Specific Risk 2 is the standard deviation of residuals 
from market model regression relative to the value-weighted average in the 2-digit industry portfolio. 
 
Panel A:     
Acquisition Characteristics N Merger Tender Offer   
Mode of acquisition 656 508 148  
 77.44% 22.56%  
    
   Hostile Friendly   
Attitude 656 27 629  
 4.12% 95.88%  
    
   All Cash All Equity Cash/Equity
Method of Payment 656 184 297 175 
 28.05% 45.27% 26.68% 
    
   Related Unrelated   
Related Acquisition 656 245 411  
 37.35% 62.65%  
    
   Multiple bidders One bidder   
Competition 656 42 614  
   6.40% 93.60%   
 
 
(Continued) 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Distribution and Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Acquisitions and Firms Characteristics 
1994-2003 
 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics   Mean  Median Min Max 
Acquirer Market Cap. ($ Millions) 656 22,545.26 5,547.81 141.39 243,142.39 
Target Market Cap. ($ Millions) 656 2,453.18 501.97 9.82 47,605.06 
Relative Market Cap.(%) 656 23.32 11.76 0.05 138.47 
 Target Governance Index 656 8.89 9 3 14 
Acquirer Governance Index 656 9.08 9 4 15 
Target Diversification 656 3.22 3 1 8 
Acquirer Diversification 656 4.89 5 1 8 
Target Herfindahl Index 606 0.8531 1 0.1627 1 
Acquirer Herfindahl Index 599 0.6994 0.7503 0.0869 1 
Firm Specific Risk 1 (Target) 609 0.0195 0.0000 -0.0021 0.1529 
Firm Specific Risk 2 (Target) 609 0.0220 0.0078 -0.0642 0.1541 
Firm Specific Risk 1 (Acquirer) 602 -0.0216 -0.0201 -0.0461 0.0958 
Firm Specific Risk 2 (Acquirer) 602 0.0165 0.0058 -0.0005 0.0963 
 
 
 
Panel C: Diversification of Target and Acquirer Firms 
   
Number of SIC Codes Target Firm Acquirer Firm 
1 150 43 
2 172 101 
3 106 80 
4 74 95 
5 42 61 
6 35 64 
7 29 42 
8 48 170 
  
Total 656 656 
Mean 3.22 4.89 
Median 3.00 5.00 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Acquisitions by Year 
 
Year  
Number of 
Deals % Of Sample  
Average Deal Value   
($ Millions) 
1994 21 3.2 1,303.73
1995 59 9.0 1,811.26
1996 61 9.3 2,187.36
1997 86 13.1 2,438.05
1998 112 17.1 6,120.55
1999 111 16.9 3,500.35
2000 92 14.0 5,927.81
2001 63 9.6 2,720.28
2002 31 4.7 2,489.17
2003  20 3.0 5,428.57
     
Total  656 100 33,927.13
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Table 3 
Compensation Characteristics of Target and Acquiring Firm CEO's 
The sample consists of 656 completed acquisitions during the period January 1, 1994, to December 31, 2003 listed 
in SDC database. All acquirer firms and 381 of the target firms have executive compensation data listed in 
ExecuComp database. For 275 of the acquisitions the executive compensation data has been manually collected 
from the proxy statements of the target firms. All compensation data is recorded for the year prior to the acquisition 
announcement date. For each firm the total compensation data is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual, LTIP, value 
of newly granted options and the value of restricted stock options. Value of previous options portfolio is computed 
as described in Appendix A. Value of the stock portfolio is computed by multiplying the number of the stock shares 
the manager holds by the share price measured at the end of the fiscal year. Ownership is computed as the ratio of 
the stock holdings of the manager to the shares outstanding of the firm as measured at the end of the fiscal year prior 
to the acquisition year.  Equity Based Incentives (EBI) are the dollar change in stock and options portfolio of Target 
(Acquiring) Firm's CEO for a $100 change in the market capitalization of the Target (Acquiring) Firm as measured 
one year prior to the announcement year. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. 
 
Compensation Component       
Panel A. Target CEO 
 ($ Thousands) Mean Median Min Max 
Median 
Percentage
Salary 465.52 400.00 74.04 1,300.00 34.77%
Bonus 400.53 144.50 0.00 4,600.00 12.46%
Other Annual 52.72 0.69 0.00 1,283.95 0.05%
Long-tem Incentive Plan Payouts 70.37 0.00 0.00 2,429.70 0.00%
Restricted Stock Grants 198.35 0.00 0.00 24,444.00 2.83%
Value of Options Granted 1,800.42 294.22 0.00 29,724.40 26.20%
Total Compensation 3,215.04 1,255.68 140.00 37,766.11 100.00%
      
Value of Options Portfolio 9,285.32 2,769.98 0.00 150,094.45 
Value of Stock Portfolio 16,956.74 3,184.37 0.00 275,498.15 
Ownership (%) 3.69 0.5 0 53.98 
EBI (per $100) 5.37 2.38 0.04 53.98 
Panel B. Acquirer CEO  
($ Thousands) Mean Median Min Max 
Median 
Percentage
Salary 719.44 684.15 100.00 2,000.00 17.94%
Bonus 1,153.89 673.99 0.00 8,749.13 17.90%
Other Annual 65.37 0.00 0.00 1,332.71 0.00%
Long-tem Incentive Plan Payouts 348.07 0.00 0.00 7,920.00 0.00%
Restricted Stock Grants 622.14 0.00 0.00 25,707.18 5.03%
Value of Options Granted 5,282.47 1,453.82 0.00 107,687.44 42.21%
Total Compensation 8,445.29 3,900.73 273.19 112,683.45 100.00%
      
Value of Options Portfolio 37,726.98 11,825.16 0.00 444,525.56 
Value of Stock Portfolio 304,924.55 10,284.65 0.00 17,474,430.12 
Ownership (%) 1.79 0.18 0 37.37 
EBI (per $100) 2.70 0.86 0.02 32.91  
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Table 4 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Dollar Wealth Gains for Target and Acquirer Firms 
The sample consists of 656 completed acquisitions during the period January 1, 1994, to December 31, 2003 listed 
in SDC database. All acquirer firms and 381 of the target firms have executive compensation data listed in 
ExecuComp database. For 275 of the acquisitions the executive compensation data has been manually collected 
from the proxy statements of the target firms. The CARs are computed based on market model for target and, 
acquiring firms. The event window starts 5 days before the date of the first bid for the target firm and ends on the 
announcement day of the successful bid. The Combined Firm CAR is computed as the market value -weighted sum 
of the target and acquiring firm CARs. Dollar Wealth gain is computed by multiplying the CAR of the firm by the 
market capitalization of the firm measured 6 days before the announcement day of the acquisition. Combined dollar 
wealth gain is computed by summing the target and acquirer firm dollar wealth gains. All variables are winsorized at 
1% level. 
 
Panel A         
CARs (%) Mean Median Min Max 
Target Firm 24.71 20.03 -24.45 102.02
Acquirer Firm -2.48 -1.98 -27.02 18.83
Combined Firm 0.72 1.02 -28.74 32.08
     
Panel B         
Dollar wealth gain ($ Millions) Mean Median Min Max 
Target Firm 393.71 102.50 -1,606.91 8,095.31
Acquirer Firm -673.79 -50.31 -19,403.63 7,433.83
Combined Firm -265.04 37.62 -19,484.28 12,895.57
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Equity Based Incentives of Target Firm's CEO and Target Firm Wealth Gains Around Takeover Announcement, with 
Diversification Level of Target Firm Interactions 
The sample consists of 656 completed acquisitions during the period January 1, 1994, to December 31, 2003. The dependent variable is the announcement period 
Target CARs for Models 1 and 2 Cumulative Abnormal Dollar Returns for the target firm for Models 3 and 4. . The event window starts 5 days before the date of the 
first bid for the target firm and ends on the announcement day of the successful bid. The main explanatory variable Equity Based Incentives (EBI) is the dollar change 
in stock and options portfolio of Target Firm's CEO for a $100 change in the market capitalization of the Target Firm as measured one year prior to the announcement 
year. Diversification Dummy is a binary variable, which equals to 1 if Target Diversification is greater than the median value of diversification in the sample, 0 
otherwise. Herfindahl Index Dummy is a binary variable, which equals to 1 if the Herfindahl Index of the Target Firm is less than the median value in the sample, 0 
otherwise. Governance Index is Gomper et.al's (2003) governance measure representing the total number of the anti-takeover provisions the target (acquiring) firm 
holds. Hostile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1if the initial attitude of the acquirer is hostile, 0 if it is friendly. Stock is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 
if the acquisition payment technique includes 100% stocks, and 0 otherwise. Tender is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the acquisition type is tender offer, 
and 0 if it is a merger. Related Business is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the target and acquirer have the same two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise. 
Competition is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if there is more than one bidder for the same target, and 0 otherwise. Acquirer (Target) Diversification is the 
number of the SIC Codes that the Acquiring ( Target)  Firm has during the year of the acquisition as reported in SDC . Relative Size is the ratio of log of market 
capitalization of the Target firm to the log of market capitalization of the Acquiring Firm measured one day before the starting date of the event window. Target Size 
is the log of market capitalization of the Target Firm measured one day before the starting date of the event window.  All variables are winsorized at 1% level and all 
specifications have year dummies. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 OLS Regressions   Median Regressions 
 Target CARs   Target Dollar Returns 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3    Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
              
Intercept 0.6712 0.6729 0.6637  -185,063 -175,067 -165,169 
 5.61*** 5.66*** 5.18***  -3.81*** -4.54*** -4.07*** 
EBI -0.0928 -0.2426 -0.2194  -52,954 -81,532 -72,059 
 -0.88 -2.10** -1.81*  -1.27 -2.15** -1.88* 
EBI*Diversification Dummy   0.7213      181,396   
   3.05***      2.52**   
EBI*HI Dummy     0.3935      53,233 
     1.91*      0.81 
Governance Index 0.0070 0.0084 0.0070  5,115 5,436 3,281 
 1.63 1.95* 1.48  2.87*** 3.76*** 2.12** 
(Continued) 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Equity Based Incentives of Target Firm's CEO and Target Firm Wealth Gains Around Takeover Announcement, with 
Diversification Level of Target Firm Interactions 
 
 OLS Regressions  Median Regressions 
 Target CARs  Target Dollar Returns 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Governance Index 0.0070 0.0084 0.0070  5,115 5,436 3,281 
 1.63 1.95* 1.48  2.87*** 3.76*** 2.12** 
Hostile 0.0116 0.0213 0.0060  91,460 99,836 122,532 
 0.24 0.44 0.12  4.42*** 5.98*** 7.44*** 
Stock -0.0287 -0.0272 -0.0282  -5,672 -6,275 -10,283 
 -1.40 -1.34 -1.29  -0.67 -0.93 -1.45 
Tender 0.1079 0.1049 0.1036  20,836 19,082 14,403 
 4.33*** 4.24*** 4.03***  2.04** 2.33** 1.73* 
Related Business -0.0179 -0.0203 -0.0173  -4,155 -7,302 -7,961 
 -0.93 -1.07 -0.86  -0.53 -1.15 -1.22 
Competition 0.0483 0.0438 0.0547  8,825 4,951 -18,747 
 1.26 1.14 1.31  0.52 0.36 -1.39 
Acquirer Diversification 0.0035 0.0045 0.0053  3,971 4,318 4,488 
 0.84 1.07 1.19  2.36** 3.19*** 3.20*** 
Target Diversification  -0.0020 -0.0077 -0.0053  2,480 923 1,582 
 -0.42 -1.50 -1.04  1.25 0.54 0.95 
Relative Size -0.4577 -0.4631 -0.4545  44,993 38,843 50,080 
 -3.53*** -3.60*** -3.37*** 1.01 1.11 1.38 
Target Size -0.0118 -0.0114 -0.0119  0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 
 -1.59 -1.55 -1.50  242.90*** 302.57*** 263.10*** 
              
Adj R2 0.1554 0.1663 0.1517  0.3138 0.3132 0.3071 
Observations 656 656 606  656 656 606 
 
Table 6 
Equity Based Incentives of Target Firm's CEO and Target Firm Wealth Gains Around 
Takeover Announcement, with Firm-specific Risk Interactions 
The sample consists of 656 completed acquisitions during the period January 1, 1994, to December 31, 2003. The 
dependent variable is the announcement period Target CARs for Models 1 and 2 Cumulative Abnormal Dollar 
Returns for the target firm for Models 3 and 4. The event window starts 5 days before the date of the first bid for the 
target firm and ends on the announcement day of the successful bid. The main explanatory variable Equity Based 
Incentives (EBI) is the dollar change in stock and options portfolio of Target Firm's CEO for a $100 change in the 
market capitalization of the Target Firm as measured one year prior to the announcement year.  Firm Specific Risk 
Dummy 1 is a binary variable which is equal to one if the variance of residuals from market model regression ( for 
target firms)relative to the median value in the 2-digit industry level is negative, 0 otherwise. Firm Specific Risk 
Dummy 2 is a binary variable which s equal to 1 if the variance of residuals from market model regression (for 
target firms) relative to the value-weighted average in the 2-digit industry portfolio is negative, 0 otherwise. 
Governance Index is Gomper et.al's (2003) governance measure representing the total number of the anti-takeover 
provisions the target firm holds. Hostile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1if the initial attitude of the acquirer 
is hostile, 0 if it is friendly. Stock is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the acquisition payment technique 
includes 100% stocks, and 0 otherwise. Tender is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the acquisition type is 
tender offer, and 0 if it is a merger. Related Business is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the target and 
acquirer have the same two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise. Competition is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if 
there is more than one bidder for the same target, and 0 otherwise. Acquirer (Target) Diversification is the number 
of the SIC Codes that the Acquiring (Target) Firm has during the year of the acquisition as reported in SDC. 
Relative Size is the ratio of log of market capitalization of the Target firm to the log of market capitalization of the 
Acquiring Firm measured one day before the starting date of the event window. Target Size is the log of market 
capitalization of the Target Firm measured one day before the starting date of the event window. All variables are 
winsorized at 1% level and all specifications have year dummies. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, 
**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 OLS Regressions  Median Regressions 
 Target CARs Target Dollar Returns 
  Model 1  Model 2   Model 3  Model 4  
          
Intercept 0.6834 0.6914  -189,479 -193,444 
 5.45*** 5.53***  -3.89*** -4.22***
EBI -0.1122 -0.1625  -73,609 -72,813 
 -0.93 -1.40  -1.66* -1.74* 
EBI*Firm-Specific Risk Dummy1 0.0252    8,877   
 0.13    0.12   
EBI*Firm-Specific Risk Dummy2   0.2789    -6,931 
   1.32    -0.09 
Governance Index 0.0068 0.0071  6,747 6,737 
 1.51 1.58  3.77*** 3.98***
Hostile -0.0101 -0.0099  86,739 75,524 
 -0.19 -0.19  4.07*** 3.84***
Stock -0.0356 -0.0341  -7,190 -7,361 
 -1.68* -1.61  -0.86 -0.92 
Tender 0.1097 0.1101  19,932 18,988 
 4.22*** 4.24***  1.95* 1.96** 
(Continued) 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
Equity Based Incentives of Target Firm's CEO and Target Firm Wealth Gains Around 
Takeover Announcement, with Firm-specific Risk Interactions 
 
 OLS Regressions  Median Regressions 
 Target CARs  Target Dollar Returns 
  Model 1  Model 2   Model 3  Model 4  
Related Business -0.0131 -0.0135  -8,893 -9,173 
 -0.65 -0.67  -1.12 -1.23 
Competition 0.0688 0.0705  19,065 30,793 
 1.72* 1.76*  1.11 1.87* 
Acquirer Diversification 0.0031 0.0028  5,270 5,083 
 0.70 0.64  3.10*** 3.18***
Target Diversification  0.0006 0.0005  2,203 2,117 
 0.11 0.09  1.09 1.11 
Relative Size -0.5197 -0.5288  32,504 38,777 
 -3.85*** -3.92***  0.74 0.93 
Target Size -0.0108 -0.0108  0.0007 0.0006 
 -1.38 -1.39  235.05*** 248.89***
          
Adjusted R2 0.1595 0.1619  0.2936 0.2936 
Observations 609 609  609 609 
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Table 7 
Equity Based Incentives of Acquirer Firm's CEO and Acquirer Firm Wealth Gains 
Around Takeover Announcement, with Related Business Interactions 
The sample consists of 656 completed acquisitions during the period January 1, 1994, to December 31, 2003. The 
dependent variable is the announcement period Acquirer CARs for Models 1 and 2 Cumulative Abnormal Dollar 
Returns for the acquiring firm for Models 3 and 4. The event window starts 5 days before the date of the first bid of 
the acquirer and ends on the announcement day of the successful bid. The main explanatory variable Equity Based 
Incentives (EBI) is the dollar change in stock and options portfolio of Acquirer Firm's CEO for a $100 change in the 
market capitalization of the Acquirer Firm as measured one year prior to the announcement year. Related Business 
is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the target and acquirer have the same two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise. 
Hostile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1if the initial attitude of the acquirer is hostile, 0 if it is friendly. Stock 
is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the acquisition payment technique includes 100% stock, and 0 otherwise. 
Tender is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the acquisition type is tender offer, and 0 if it is a merger. Related 
Business is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the target and acquirer have the same two-digit SIC code, and 0 
otherwise. Competition is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if there is more than one bidder for the same target, 
and 0 otherwise. Acquirer (Target) Diversification is the number of the SIC Codes that the Acquiring (Target) Firm 
has during the year of the acquisition as reported in SDC. Relative Size is the ratio of log of market capitalization of 
the Target firm to the log of market capitalization of the Acquiring Firm measured one day before the starting date 
of the event window. Acquirer Size is the log of market capitalization of the Acquirer Firm measured one day before 
the starting date of the event window. All variables are winsorized at 1% level and all specifications have year 
dummies. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 OLS Regressions  Median Regressions 
 Acquirer CARs Acquirer Dollar Returns 
  Model 1  Model 2   Model 3  Model 4  
Intercept 0.2167 0.2168  331,267 354,926 
 3.36*** 3.36***  1.77* 1.63 
EBI -0.0809 -0.0877  128,803 92,646 
 -1.24 -0.90  0.47 0.19 
EBI*Related Business Dummy   0.0124    121,056 
   0.10    0.19 
Hostile 0.0306 0.0306  75,256 64,725 
 1.64 1.64  0.91 0.67 
Stock -0.0145 -0.0145  -53,363 -63,433 
 -1.85* -1.86*  -1.58 -1.61 
Tender 0.0125 0.0125  9,966 13,594 
 1.32 1.32  0.25 0.29 
Related Business 0.0024 0.0021  -5,134 -11,452 
 0.33 0.26  -0.16 -0.28 
Competition -0.0319 -0.0319  -65,629 -64,485 
 -2.17** -2.17**  -0.96 -0.80 
Acquirer Diversification -0.0002 -0.0002  -7,915 -7,239 
 -0.13 -0.12  -1.14 -0.89 
Target Diversification  0.0040 0.0040  8,475 10,193 
 2.21** 2.21**  1.11 1.14 
 
(Continued) 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
Equity Based Incentives of Acquirer Firm's CEO and Acquirer Firm Wealth Gains 
Around Takeover Announcement, with Related Business Interactions 
 
 OLS Regressions Median Regressions 
 Acquirer CARs Acquirer Dollar Returns 
  Model 1  Model 2   Model 3   Model 4  
Relative Size -0.1910 -0.1908 -446,047 -427,331 
 -4.46*** -4.44*** -2.46** -2.01** 
Acquirer Size -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0215 -0.0214 
 -2.07** -2.07** -58.21*** -49.54*** 
     
Adj R2 0.0611 0.0596 0.0351 0.0342 
Observations 656 656 656 656 
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Table 8 
Managerial Incentives and the Probability of a Successful Takeover 
The sample consists of 760 completed and failed acquisitions during the period January 1, 1994, to December 31, 
2003. The dependent variable is a binary variable, which is equal to 1 if the acquisition offer is completed 
successfully, and 0 if it failed. The main explanatory variables Acquirer (Target) Equity Based Incentives (EBI) is 
the dollar change in stock and options portfolio of Acquirer's (Target) CEO for a $100 change in the market 
capitalization of the Acquiring (Target) Firm as measured one year prior to the announcement year. Diversification 
Dummy is a binary variable, which equals to 1 if Target Diversification is greater than the median value of 
diversification in the sample, 0 otherwise. Herfindahl Index Dummy is a binary variable, which equals to 1 if the 
Herfindahl Index of the Target Firm is less than the median value in the sample, 0 otherwise.  Governance Index is 
Gomper et.al's (2003) governance measure representing the total number of the anti-takeover provisions the target 
firm holds. Tenure Dummy is equal to 1 if the tenure of the Target CEO is greater than the median value in the 
sample, 0 otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1if the initial attitude of the acquirer is hostile, 0 
if it is friendly. Stock is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the acquisition payment technique includes 100% 
stock, and 0 otherwise. Tender isa dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the acquisition type is tender offer, and 0 
if it is a merger. Related Business is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the target and acquirer have the same 
two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise. Competition is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if there is more than one 
bidder for the same target, and 0 otherwise. Acquirer (Target) Diversification is the number of the SIC Codes that 
the Acquiring (Target) Firm has during the year of the acquisition as reported in SDC. Relative Size is the ratio of 
log of market capitalization of the Target firm to the log of market capitalization of the Acquiring Firm measured 
one day before the starting date of the event window. All variables are winsorized at 1% level and all specifications 
have year dummies. The numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model4  Model 5  
Intercept 2.9709 2.9856 2.6787 2.9874 2.9290 
 3.28*** 2.86*** 2.74*** 2.62*** 2.57** 
Acquirer EBI -4.1285 -4.3355 -3.9011 -4.2196 -4.2715 
 -2.31** -2.37** -2.18** -2.00** -2.04** 
Target EBI 6.8218 10.9765 9.0251 6.4225 8.2073 
 1.80* 2.03** 1.84* 1.37 1.61 
Target EBI*Diversification 
Dummy   -10.1545       
   -1.52       
Target EBI*HI Dummy     -3.8276     
     -0.61     
Target EBI*Firm Specific 
Dummy 1       -1.6851   
       -0.24   
Target EBI*Firm Specific 
Dummy 2         -2.8341 
         -0.42 
Target Firm Governance 
Index -0.0131 -0.0200 -0.0123 -0.0217 -0.0193 
 -0.04 -0.31 -0.19 -0.32 -0.28 
Hostile -3.0614 -3.0993 -2.9322 -3.1761 -3.1672 
 -7.96*** -7.92*** -7.46*** -7.79*** -7.75***
Stock 0.4753 0.4564 0.3920 0.4163 0.4086 
 1.55 1.48 1.24 1.30 1.28 
(Continued) 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
Managerial Incentives and the Probability of a Successful Takeover 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model4  Model 5  
Tender 1.7346 1.7595 1.6990 1.8536 1.8529 
 3.79*** 3.84*** 3.73*** 3.71*** 3.71***
Related Business -0.0425 -0.0258 -0.0881 0.0403 0.0382 
 -0.14 -0.08 -0.28 0.12 0.12 
Competition -1.4950 -1.5053 -1.3512 -1.4008 -1.4043 
 -4.24*** -4.29*** -3.70*** -3.74*** -3.76***
Acquirer Diversification -0.0222 -0.0237 -0.0269 -0.0211 -0.0204 
 -0.34 -0.36 -0.41 -0.31 -0.30 
Target Diversification  -0.0057 0.0400 -0.0051 -0.0131 -0.0099 
 -0.09 0.55 -0.08 -0.18 -0.14 
Relative Size -1.3727 -1.3465 -1.2290 -1.2438 -1.2300 
 -3.58*** -3.53*** -3.02*** -3.07*** -3.04***
           
Pseduo R2 0.3692 0.3729 0.3472 0.3724 0.3726 
Observations 760 760 701 707 707 
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Table 9 
Unsuccessful Bidders in Successful Multi-bidder Takeover Deals 
The sample consists of 60 bidders (30 successful and 30 failed) from 30 matched contests during the period January 
1, 1994, to December 31, 2003. In Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable equals one for successful (unsuccessful) 
bidders if the abnormal wealth gain for the successful bidder is positive (negative), zero (one) otherwise. In Models 
3 and 4, the dependent variable equals one if the bidder has a positive abnormal wealth gain, zero otherwise. The 
main explanatory variables Acquirer (Target) Equity Based Incentives (EBI) is the dollar change in stock and 
options portfolio of Acquirer's (Target) CEO for a $100 change in the market capitalization of the Acquiring 
(Target) Firm as measured one year prior to the announcement year. Related Business is a dummy variable, which 
equals to 1 if the target and acquirer have the same two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise.  Hostile is a dummy 
variable which is equal to 1if the initial attitude of the acquirer is hostile, 0 if it is friendly. Stock is a dummy 
variable which is equal to 1 if the acquisition payment technique includes 100% stock, and 0 otherwise. Tender is a 
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the acquisition type is tender offer, and 0 if it is a merger. Related Business is 
a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the target and acquirer have the same two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise.  
Acquirer (Target) Diversification is the number of the SIC Codes that the Acquiring (Target) Firm has during the 
year of the acquisition as reported in SDC. Relative Size is the ratio of log of market capitalization of the Target 
firm to the log of market capitalization of the Acquiring Firm measured one day before the starting date of the event 
window. All variables are winsorized at 1% level and all specifications have year dummies. The numbers in 
parentheses are z-statistics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model4  
Intercept 2.7220 2.5059  -2.7147 -2.2555 
 1.43 1.31  -1.17 -0.95 
Acquirer EBI -10.2773 2.0483  -8.6800 -91.1044 
 -1.38 0.09  -1.47 -1.34 
Acquirer EBI*Related 
Business Dummy   -14.2053
 
   82.9481 
   -0.61    1.23 
Target EBI -5.8916 -5.6761  13.0815 17.7675 
 -0.64 -0.61  1.26 1.56 
Hostile 0.8366 0.7675  0.9307 1.1243 
 1.19 1.09  1.03 1.16 
Stock 0.9279 0.9087  2.9799 3.4027 
 1.14 1.11  2.43** 2.60***
Tender 0.1995 0.1163  1.8624 2.2019 
 0.23 0.13  1.72* 1.98** 
Related Business  -0.7302 -0.3969  0.6503 -0.4418 
 -0.88 -0.41  0.60 -0.34 
Acquirer Diversification -0.3292 -0.3094  -0.0763 -0.0778 
 -1.82* -1.70*  -0.37 -0.37 
Target Diversification  -0.1475 -0.1671  0.0609 0.0750 
 -0.86 -0.96  0.29 0.34 
Relative Size -0.1924 -0.1726  -3.2421 -3.1358 
 -0.32 -0.28  -2.21** -2.16** 
          
Pseduo R2 0.1483 0.1534  0.3281 0.3558 
Observations 60 60  60 60 
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Table 10 
Equity Based Incentives of Target Firm's CEO and Target CARs around Takeover Announcement: Alternative EBI Measures 
The sample consists of 656 completed acquisitions during the period January 1, 1994, to December 31, 2003. The dependent variable is the announcement period 
Target CARs for all models in the table. The event window starts 5 days before the date of the first bid for the target firm and ends on the announcement day of the 
successful bid. EBI2 is the ratio of the market value of equity portfolio  (stocks and options) to the total compensation for the target manager measured one year prior 
to the announcement year.  EBI3 is the ratio of the market value of equity portfolio  (stocks and options) to the sum of bonus and cash components of compensation 
for the target manager measured one year prior to the announcement year.  Diversification Dummy is a binary variable, which equals to 1 if Target Diversification is 
greater than the median value of diversification in the sample, 0 otherwise. Herfindahl Index Dummy is a binary variable, which equals to 1 if the Herfindahl Index of 
the Target Firm is less than the median value in the sample, 0 otherwise. Firm Specific Risk Dummy 1 is a binary variable, which is equal to one if the variance of 
residuals from market model regression (for target firms) relative to the median value in the 2-digit industry level is negative, 0 otherwise. Firm Specific Risk 
Dummy 2 is a binary variable which s equal to 1 if the variance of residuals from market model regression (for target firms) relative to the value-weighted average in 
the 2-digit industry portfolio is negative, 0 otherwise. Control variables are described in Table 5. All variables are winsorized at 1% level and all specifications have 
year dummies. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4   Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8   
Intercept 0.6523 0.6059 0.6576 0.6595 0.6445 0.5989 0.6549 0.6537 
 5.65*** 4.87*** 5.44*** 5.45 *** 5.58*** 4.81*** 5.42*** 5.40*** 
EBI2 -0.3339 -0.3855 -0.3925 -0.3200         
 -1.71* -1.91* -1.73* -1.55         
EBI3         -0.1312 -0.2999 -0.1666 -0.1195 
         -1.33 -2.01** -1.65* -1.24 
EBI2*Diversification Dummy 0.8338               
 1.60               
EBI2*HI Dummy   0.3659             
   1.85*             
EBI2*Firm-Specific Risk Dummy1    0.4718           
     1.36           
EBI2*Firm-Specific Risk Dummy2      0.4628         
       1.16         
EBI3*Diversification Dummy         0.1271       
         0.64       
EBI3*HI Dummy           0.3595     
           1.84*     
(Continued) 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
Equity Based Incentives of Target Firm's CEO and Target CARs around Takeover Announcement: Alternative EBI Measures 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
EBI3*Firm-Specific Risk Dummy1            0.2342   
             1.29   
EBI3*Firm-Specific Risk Dummy2              0.0840 
               0.41 
Governance Index  0.0076 0.0069 0.0068 0.0070 0.0070 0.0065 0.0066 0.0067 
 1.75* 1.45 1.51 1.57 1.62 1.38 1.48 1.48 
Hostile 0.0163 0.0068 -0.0097 -0.0095 0.0126 0.0052 -0.0106 -0.0098 
 0.33 0.14 -0.18 -0.18 0.26 0.10 -0.20 -0.18 
Stock -0.0269 -0.0267 -0.0342 -0.0335 -0.0272 -0.0253 -0.0341 -0.0344 
 -1.32 -1.22 -1.62 -1.58 -1.33 -1.16 -1.61 -1.62 
Tender 0.1077 0.1043 0.1090 0.1092 0.1080 0.1040 0.1093 0.1094 
 4.34*** 4.06*** 4.20*** 4.21*** 4.34*** 4.05*** 4.21*** 4.21***
Related Business -0.0185 -0.0161 -0.0125 -0.0128 -0.0180 -0.0167 -0.0121 -0.0129 
 -0.97 -0.80 -0.63 -0.64 -0.94 -0.83 -0.60 -0.64 
Competition 0.0445 0.0522 0.0688 0.0689 0.0471 0.0539 0.0690 0.0684 
 1.16 1.25 1.72* 1.73* 1.22 1.30 1.73* 1.71* 
Acquirer Diversification 0.0038 0.0051 0.0030 0.0031 0.0035 0.0051 0.0027 0.0029 
 0.89 1.14 0.69 0.69 0.82 1.14 0.60 0.65 
Target Diversification  -0.0047 -0.0058 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0032 -0.0061 0.0002 0.0002 
 -0.93 -1.12 0.00 -0.01 -0.65 -1.19 0.04 0.04 
Relative Size -0.4593 -0.4461 -0.5117 -0.5173 -0.4613 -0.4625 -0.5292 -0.5266 
 -3.55*** -3.31*** -3.80*** -3.84*** -3.56*** -3.43*** -3.93*** -3.90***
Target Size -0.0103 -0.0085 -0.0095 -0.0095 -0.0095 -0.0063 -0.0080 -0.0081 
 -1.41 -1.08 -1.23 -1.23 -1.28 -0.79 -1.04 -1.05 
                 
Adj R2 0.1584 0.1522 0.1626 0.1619 0.1554 0.1528 0.1625 0.1603 
Observations 656 606 609 609 656 606 609 609 
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Table 11 
Equity Based Incentives of Acquirer Firm's CEO and Acquirer CARs around Takeover 
Announcement: Alternative EBI Measures 
The sample consists of 656 completed acquisitions during the period January 1, 1994, to December 31, 2003. The 
dependent variable is the announcement period Acquirer CARs for all models in the table. The announcement period 
starts 5 days before the announcement of the first bid of the acquirer and ends on the announcement day of the successful 
bid. EBI2 is the ratio of the market value of equity portfolio (stocks and options) to the total compensation for the target 
manager measured one year prior to the announcement year. EBI3 is the ratio of the market value of equity portfolio 
(stocks and options) to the sum of bonus and cash components of compensation for the target manager measured one 
year prior to the announcement year. Related Business is a dummy variable, which equals to one if the target and 
acquirer have the same two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise. Control variables are described in Table 7. All variables are 
winsorized at 1% level and all specifications have year dummies. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4  
Intercept 0.2023 0.2015 0.2023 0.2014 
 3.19*** 3.16*** 3.18 *** 3.16*** 
EBI2 -0.0002 -0.00005     
 -0.28 -0.06     
EBI3     -0.0001 -0.00003 
     -0.27 -0.06 
EBI2*Related Business Dummy   -0.0003     
   -0.22     
EBI3*Related Business Dummy       -0.0001 
       -0.22 
Hostile 0.0308 0.0309 0.0308 0.0309 
 1.65* 1.65* 1.65 * 1.65* 
Stock -0.0147 -0.0146 -0.0147 -0.0146 
 -1.89* -1.86* -1.89 * -1.86* 
Tender 0.0132 0.0132 0.0132 0.0132 
 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.39 
Related Business 0.0028 0.0030 0.0028 0.0030 
 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.41 
Competition -0.0321 -0.0321 -0.0321 -0.0321 
 -2.18** -2.18** -2.18 ** -2.18** 
Acquirer Diversification 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Target Diversification  0.0040 0.0040 0.0040 0.0040 
 2.24** 2.23** 2.24 ** 2.23** 
Relative Size -0.1871 -0.1870 -0.1870 -0.1868 
 -4.37*** -4.37*** -4.37 *** -4.36*** 
Acquirer Size -0.0045 -0.0044 -0.0045 -0.0044 
 -1.87* -1.86* -1.87 * -1.86* 
         
Adj R2 0.0589 0.0575 0.0589 0.0575 
Observations 656 656 656 656 
 
